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It was the best of times, it was the 
worst of times. 
In 2017, Pacific collective diplomacy 
reached new heights, with Island 
nations campaigning on the oceans, 
climate change, and nuclear disar-
mament through the Pacific Small 
Island Developing States (psids). Fiji 
completed its presidency of the UN 
General Assembly, cohosted the first 
global conference on the oceans, and 
took up the presidency of cop23—
the 23rd Conference of the Parties of 
the UN Framework Convention on 
 Climate Change.
At the same time, the US adminis-
tration under President Donald Trump 
announced—often through tweets—
policies on climate change, nuclear 
weapons, and maritime law that 
rolled back the achievements of years 
of patient international diplomacy. 
With uncertainty over the post-2020 
relationship with the European Union, 
growing Chinese power, and adverse 
climate policies from Canberra, it was 
a difficult year for Pacific regionalism.
As the Pacific Community (spc) 
marked its 70th anniversary, key 
regional initiatives—from ramsi to 
pacer-Plus negotiations—came to an 
end. At the same time, regional orga-
nizations struggled with their attitude 
toward independence for the remain-
ing Pacific territories.
The central theme of the Septem-
ber 2017 Forum leaders’ meeting 
was “The Blue Pacific—Our Sea of 
Islands.” Drawing together regional 
priorities on the oceans, climate 
change, security, and fisheries, the 
theme echoed the vision of the late 
Epeli Hau‘ofa by lauding the inter-
connections of the liquid continent 
(Waddell, Naidu, and Hau‘ofa 1993). 
At the Forum’s opening ceremony 
in Apia, host Prime Minister Tui-
laepa Sailele Malielegaoi said: “The 
Blue Pacific provides a new narrative 
for Pacific regionalism and how the 
Forum engages with the world. It 
will require a different way of work-
ing together that prioritizes The Blue 
Pacific as the core driver of Forum 
policymaking and collective action” 
(Tuilaepa 2017a).
Throughout 2017, Pacific gov-
ernments promoted the Blue Pacific 
agenda on the international stage. 
Holding the presidency of the United 
Nations General Assembly (unga) 
in 2016–2017—an unprecedented 
achievement for an Island nation—
Fiji’s Ambassador Peter Thomson 
used his position to raise interna-
tional awareness of regional concerns. 
 Completing his ambassadorship in 
September, Thomson was appointed 
as the first UN special envoy for 
the ocean by UN Secretary-General 
António Guterres.
Action around the oceans was a 
central regional priority. Secretary-
General of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Dame Meg Taylor, who also serves as 
Pacific Oceans commissioner, noted: 
“A healthy Pacific Ocean means a 
prosperous Pacific people. The ocean 
is integral to our cultures, well-being 
and economic growth” (Fiji Sun 
2017).
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In 2015, as the United Nations 
adopted seventeen new Sustainable 
Development Goals (sdgs), Pacific 
governments successfully pushed for 
a specific goal on the oceans and seas. 
sdg14 pledges action to “conserve 
and sustainably use the oceans, seas 
and marine resources for sustainable 
development” (UN 2017a).
To implement sdg14, Fiji and 
Sweden cohosted the high-level UN 
Conference on the Oceans and Seas in 
New York in June 2017. This confer-
ence issued a call for action, highlight-
ing action on ocean acidification, 
plastics, and overfishing. By the end 
of the conference, 1,328 voluntary 
commitments had been registered by 
governments, UN bodies, nongovern-
ment organizations, private corpo-
rations, and others, far exceeding 
expectations. Pacific governments now 
hope to update the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (unclos) through 
talks on a new agreement on conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological 
diversity in areas beyond national 
jurisdictions.
The Oceans Conference also pro-
vided a platform to draw attention 
to Pacific fisheries policy. Director 
General of the Forum Fisheries Agency 
(ffa) James Movick noted: “More 
than any other UN Conference, this 
is one event where the Pacific nations 
are coming to demonstrate their global 
leadership of the issue on the table. 
They are coming to talk Oceans, and 
the Pacific lessons and achievements 
when it comes to sustainable tuna fish-
eries management” (Fiji Sun 2017).
But this cooperation is compli-
cated by the influence of Distant 
Water Fishing Nations (dwfn) and 
colonial powers in the region like the 
United States and France. The 2016 
decision to include French Polynesia 
and New Caledonia as full members 
of the Forum has raised difficult 
issues for agencies in the Council of 
Regional Organizations of the Pacific 
(crop), in some of which France is 
not a  member. Some fisheries officials 
have raised concern that confidential 
positions on the management and 
conservation of tuna have been com-
promised with the effective inclusion 
of France—through its Pacific collec-
tivities—as an ffa member (Maclellan 
2018). 
Transform Aqorau, the former chief 
executive officer of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (pna), expressed 
concern over France’s new influence: 
“I know that the ffa membership 
is deeply concerned about the impli-
cations of sharing the same room 
with France in Pacific Island tuna 
discussions, and this issue was dis-
cussed at great lengths at the recent 
Pacific  Fisheries Ministers’ meeting 
in the Gold Coast. . . . there is now a 
 perception that the ffa’s position has 
been compromised” (Pareti 2017).
pna held their annual officials 
meeting in April in Majuro and a min-
isterial meeting in July in Queensland. 
pna chief executive officer Ludwig 
Kumoru said that the organization’s 
priority remains adding value to 
fisheries and increasing revenues for 
Island nations. Revenue to the Islands 
from the purse seine skipjack fish-
ery has increased from nearly us$60 
million in 2010 to us$400 million in 
2016 (ffa 2017a). Despite these eco-
nomic benefits, fish stocks are under 
pressure as dwfn expand their opera-
tions, although the latest report card 
on fisheries assessed that the bigeye 
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tuna stock is not overfished, as previ-
ously reported (ffa 2017b, 2).
Throughout 2017, despite head-
winds blowing from Washington and 
Canberra, Pacific Island nations sailed 
ahead to address the adverse effects of 
climate change.
Announcing an a$6 million (us$4.7 
million) grant and key staff to the sec-
retariat in Suva that managed prepara-
tions for cop23, Australian Senator 
Concetta Fierravanti-Wells said: “We 
are at the coal face here in the Pacific 
of dealing with issues consequent to 
climate events” (Pacific Beat 2017). It 
was an unfortunate choice of words, 
since many Pacific Islanders are hop-
ing that Australia will step away from 
the coal face!
As Australian Ambassador for 
Climate Change Patrick Suckling 
visited Suva in February for bilateral 
talks with the Bainimarama govern-
ment, the Pacific Islands Climate 
Action Network (pican) issued an 
open letter challenging Australia’s 
plans for new coal mines and exports 
(pican 2017). In May, President Hilda 
Heine of the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands (RMI) was openly critical of 
Australian climate policy in a speech 
in Canberra: “Now is not the time 
to be debating the science, trashing 
solar power, or building new coal 
mines. . . . I can assure you it does 
influence the way Australia is viewed 
in the Pacific” (Heine 2017).
In June, Fiji, Marshall Islands, 
Tuvalu, and other nations also criti-
cized President Trump’s decision to 
pull out of the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change. Fiji Prime Minister 
Voreqe Bainimarama called the deci-
sion “deeply disappointing for the 
citizens of vulnerable nations through-
out the world” (Bainimarama 2017). 
Tuvalu’s Enele Sopoaga also noted: 
“It is simple arrogance, meaning at 
the end of the day, it’s the money 
issue that is driving climate change” 
 (Qounadovu 2017).
Throughout the year, Island states 
coordinated their efforts in the lead-up 
to the annual global climate negotia-
tions. With Prime Minister Bainima-
rama absent from the Forum leaders’ 
meeting in September, Fiji’s Ambas-
sador Amena Yauvoli hosted a sidebar 
event to discuss regional priorities for 
cop23. The Pacific Climate Change 
Roundtable, held on 4–5 October, 
announced a center of excellence for 
Pacific climate action in Apia, at the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (sprep) 
campus. The Pacific Climate Change 
Centre will serve as the Pacific Meteo-
rological Council’s primary train-
ing and partnership provider for the 
region. The 2017 Pre-cop Ministerial 
Dialogue was then held in Nadi on 
17–18 October.
The culmination of all this prepara-
tion came in November, as Fiji pre-
sided over cop23 in Bonn, Germany—
the first time a Pacific Island nation 
had played that role.
Despite raising the profile of Fiji 
and the Pacific, cop23 saw major set-
backs for some key regional priorities. 
Analysts noted that “the final decision 
on Loss and Damage is hopelessly 
weak” and the outcome of the climate 
finance negotiations “were predictably 
unremarkable” (Schalatek, Fuhr, and 
Lehr 2017). Over the next year, Fiji 
will continue in the cop presidency, 
opening the way for a 2018 “Talanoa 
Dialogue” to feed into the 2019 cop, 
“which will hopefully build enhanced 
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trust to increase ambition for both 
mitigation and support in the post-
2020 period” (Schalatek, Fuhr, and 
Lehr 2017). 
In Bonn, there was also frank dis-
cussion about keeping coal and other 
fossil fuels in the ground in order to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A 
new alliance of twenty nations com-
mitted to moving away from burn-
ing coal. This “Powering Past Coal 
Alliance” included Fiji, France, the 
Marshall Islands, Niue, and New Zea-
land—but not Australia—as founding 
members (Morgan 2017).
Former President of Kiribati Anote 
Tong and François Martel of the 
Pacific Islands Development Forum 
(pidf) both signed the Lofoten 
 Declaration, a high-level call to con-
strain oil, gas, and coal production. 
Tong noted: “Fossil fuels will destroy 
our home. Two degrees will destroy 
our home” (Feagaimaali‘i-Luamanu 
2017). Speaking in Bonn, he added: 
“If you’re going to open another coal 
mine then you are not transitioning 
[to renewables], you are lying to us” 
(sbs 2017).
For all of these items on the Blue 
Pacific agenda—oceans, fisheries, 
climate change, and maritime secu-
rity—the influence and appetites of 
powerful partners complicated the 
agenda for Pacific Island governments. 
As in recent years, 2017 was marked 
by jostling between international 
players, many of whom import their 
own disputes into Pacific regional 
 organizations.
This problem has particularly been 
exacerbated by the incoherence of 
policy coming out of Washington. The 
Trump administration seeks to con-
tain China but abandoned a central 
 pillar of the Obama administration’s 
containment policy—the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement. Threatening 
“fire and fury” against the people of 
Korea, Trump sought support from 
Pacific allies to pressure the Kim 
Jong-un regime on nuclear prolifera-
tion. But a year after taking office, the 
Trump administration had not even 
nominated US ambassadors to South 
Korea or Australia, key regional allies 
in the quest to contain Kim. The US 
delegation to the 48th Pacific Islands 
Forum was led by Susan Thornton, 
acting assistant secretary for East Asia 
and the Pacific. However, Thornton 
was only nominated to the US Sen-
ate five days before Christmas 2017, 
delaying confirmation for this key 
posting covering Asia-Pacific hotspots. 
Pacific regional governance was 
also affected by the outcomes of 
national elections and no-confidence 
motions. A number of politicians 
returned to office in 2017, including 
Papua New Guinea’s Peter O’Neill, 
Tonga’s ‘Akilisi Pōhiva, Niue’s Toke 
Talagi, and New Caledonia’s Philippe 
Germain. There were also new faces in 
leadership. In New Zealand, Labour’s 
new Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
replaced National Party leadership 
under John Key and Bill English 
(Ardern will become the first Forum 
leader to give birth while in office, 
after announcing an unexpected 
pregnancy). In Solomon Islands, 
former Reserve Bank Governor Rick 
Houenipwela won power in a Novem-
ber no-confidence motion, replacing 
Manasseh Sogavare. 
In 2016–2017, the regional agen-
cies reviewed the crop Charter. First 
created in 2012, this charter guides 
regional institutional coordination and 
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collaboration in an attempt to limit 
long-running turf wars between crop 
members.
The Forum Secretariat also under-
took internal reviews, including an 
analysis of governance and financing, 
a review of Forum meetings, and an 
overview “State of Pacific Regional-
ism Report 2017.” With Australia 
and New Zealand providing the bulk 
of the secretariat’s core funding, 
the task of developing a new fund-
ing strategy—with the independence 
that implies—becomes all the more 
important. Forum Secretary-General 
Taylor noted: “We’ve completed a 
strategic framework for the Secretariat 
and are very conscious that our first 
priority has to be people-centered 
development. We need to ensure that 
there is not just physical security, but 
also food security and environmental 
 security for people in our region” 
(Maclellan 2017e).
Taylor also serves as chair of the 
crop, which met in Honiara in Febru-
ary and reaffirmed the Framework 
for Pacific Regionalism (fpr) as a 
key mechanism for policy develop-
ment. In late 2017, the Forum Secre-
tariat reopened the process for public 
submissions to determine new fpr 
priorities.
The Pacific Community (spc) Com-
mittee of Representatives of Govern-
ments and Administrations met in July 
in Nouméa, marking seventy years 
since the regional technical agency was 
created as the South Pacific Com-
mission. To highlight the 70th anni-
versary, spc celebrated the life and 
achievements of seventy astounding 
Pacific women in the lead-up to the 
13th Triennial Conference of Pacific 
Women in October.
Other regional agencies suffered 
internal challenges. The pidf faced 
funding problems as Fiji diverted 
resources to its international dip-
lomatic initiatives. The Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (msg) resolved an 
internal staffing dispute, after the 
Vanuatu Supreme Court cleared msg 
Director General Amena Yauvoli of 
any wrongdoing over the dispute (msg 
2017). Yauvoli later faced further 
whispers as he took up a key role in 
cop23 preparations on behalf of Fiji, 
leading to lengthy absences from the 
msg Secretariat in Port Vila.
At a time of changing patterns 
of Official Development Assistance 
(oda) and climate finance, donor 
funding remains a core concern. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (oecd) 
officially determined that the Cook 
Islands will graduate to developed 
country status in late 2018, remov-
ing it from the oecd Development 
Advisory Committee list of countries 
eligible for oda (oecd 2017). Other 
countries also face graduation to 
high-income status in coming years, 
including Palau, Niue, Nauru, Wallis 
and Futuna, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, 
and Tonga, all of which are listed on 
the oecd list of upper middle income 
oda recipients.
The Trump administration also 
refused to provide a further us$2 
billion that was pledged to the Green 
Climate Fund (gcf) by former US 
President Barack Obama, even as 
Pacific leaders were already decrying 
the bureaucracy that limits access to 
the gcf and other funding mecha-
nisms. In frustration, Kiribati Presi-
dent Taneti Maamau told the unga: 
“Access to climate financing, like the 
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Green Climate Fund, takes too long to 
process and disburse. We simply can-
not afford to wait any longer. . . . With 
the approval of Parliament, my Gov-
ernment is leveraging our sovereign 
wealth fund as collateral for conces-
sional debt financing. This is a move 
beyond tradition but we would rather 
take the initiative to drive our own 
aspirations and deliver to our people 
than to wait on financial assistance 
that may come at a moment far too 
late” (Maamau 2017).
US climate vandalism has opened 
the way for France to step up as a 
champion of climate action in the 
Pacific. Sebastian Lecornu, secretary 
of state to the minister for the eco-
logical and inclusive transition in the 
Emmanuel Macron administration, 
led the French delegation to the 2017 
Forum leaders’ meeting.
Lecornu stressed the significance 
of improved relations between France 
and Forum member countries and 
encouraged participation in President 
Macron’s “One Planet” global climate 
summit, held in Paris in December: 
“If the door to the Forum is open, it’s 
because the policies taken up by the 
President of the Republic Emmanuel 
Macron, the head of State, have 
created a longing for France. This is 
because there are a number of large 
nations which address the issue of 
climate change and global warming, 
but without as much enthusiasm, as 
much energy and maybe even courage 
as France” (Lecornu 2017).
Australia remains the largest aid, 
trade, and military power in the 
South Pacific, providing nearly a$1 
billion (us$780.4 million) in oda to 
the Islands each year. But in recent 
times, the country’s standing has been 
 damaged by policies that adversely 
affect neighboring islands: the ongo-
ing commitment to expanded coal 
exports at a time when Pacific gov-
ernments are seeking reduced use of 
fossil fuels; the expensive and unre-
solved warehousing of asylum seekers 
and refugees on Manus and Nauru; 
cutbacks to Radio Australia, including 
the January 2017 closure of shortwave 
broadcasting to isolated rural com-
munities; the abolition of AusAID as 
an independent statutory organization; 
and the gutting of the overseas aid 
program, slashed to the lowest ratio of 
gross national income ever recorded.
Strategic studies academic Joanne 
Wallis stated that Australia’s “prepon-
derant material power does not neces-
sarily translate into effective levers 
of influence, that is, effective tools of 
coercion, inducement or persuasion” 
over Forum Island countries (2017, 5). 
She argued that Australia’s “role as an 
alliance partner and local franchisee 
of the Western brand” limits its influ-
ence, at a time of diplomatic activism 
by Pacific states and growing activity 
by China, Indonesia, and India (Wallis 
2017, 255).
In response to this paradox of 
extensive power but declining influ-
ence, 2017 witnessed a renewed verbal 
assertiveness from Canberra, criticiz-
ing Chinese influence in domestic and 
regional politics. This was amplified 
as Prime Minister Malcolm Turn-
bull extended collaboration with the 
Trump administration over maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea and 
North Korean nuclear proliferation. 
Australia also promoted increased 
quadrilateral coordination with the 
United States, Japan, and India to 
contain China, even though  Canberra 
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denies this is the objective of its 
 strategic partnerships.
At the 2016 Forum leaders’ meeting 
in Pohnpei, Prime Minister Turn-
bull committed to a “step change” 
in Australia’s engagement with the 
Islands (Turnbull 2016). In August 
2017, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop 
outlined this change in a major speech 
on Pacific policy in Suva. She pledged 
to strengthen partnerships with Forum 
Island countries in three areas: “for 
economic growth . . . for our secu-
rity . . . and to support relationships 
between our people” (Bishop 2017). 
At the 2017 Forum in Apia the fol-
lowing month, Turnbull announced a 
suite of initiatives, including a Pacific 
Labour Scheme for smaller Island 
states and efforts to reduce the cost 
of remittances from Australia to the 
Pacific.
This was followed in November by 
the release of a major Foreign Policy 
White Paper, which highlights growing 
Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific 
region and calls for enhanced engage-
ment between Australia and the Pacific 
Islands. According to the white paper, 
“The stability and economic progress 
of Papua New Guinea, other Pacific 
island countries and Timor-Leste is of 
fundamental importance to Australia” 
(Australian Government 2017, 99). 
Australia’s approach to the region is 
based on “helping to integrate Pacific 
countries into the Australian and New 
Zealand economies and our security 
institutions, [as] essential to the long-
term stability and economic prospects 
of the Pacific” (Australian Govern-
ment 2017, 8).
Even so, a central element of this 
economic integration, the pacer-Plus 
trade agreement (an outcome of the 
2001 Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations [pacer]) was not 
even mentioned in the white paper’s 
chapter on the Pacific. After nearly 
two decades of preparation and seven 
years of negotiations, pacer-Plus 
arrived in June with a dull thud, at a 
signing ceremony in Nuku‘alofa. 
After initially refusing to sign 
the treaty in Tonga, Vanuatu Prime 
 Minister Charlot Salwai later signed 
at a ceremony on the fringes of the 
Pacific Islands Forum in September. 
By year’s end, however, Papua New 
Guinea and Fiji had refused to sign 
the treaty. This decision by the largest 
Island trading nations is a sign that 
there is a need for more creative initia-
tives to promote trade and investment, 
at a time of growing protectionist 
measures among oecd countries.
When negotiations started in 2009, 
politicians from Australia and New 
Zealand stressed that pacer-Plus was 
different from standard free trade 
deals and would be development 
focused. The Office of the Chief Trade 
Advisor (octa) tried to highlight 
the benefits of the treaty for Forum 
Island countries (octa 2017), but 
post-signing analysis of the deal has 
highlighted the lack of ambition, the 
failure to lock in labor market access 
in the binding treaty, and the dispro-
portionate benefits for Australia and 
New Zealand. Most commentators 
were dismissive, with headlines such 
as “Disappointment and Lost Oppor-
tunity” (Gay 2017) and “Not Much to 
Celebrate” (Dornan 2017).
Former Forum Secretary-General 
Sir Noel Levi, who guided the initial 
drafting of the Pacific Island Coun-
tries Trade Agreement and pacer 
in the late 1990s, was scathing over 
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the  outcome of “pacer Minus.” He 
decried the lack of leadership by his 
successors for not addressing objec-
tions raised by Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea: “I question why those at the 
helm of Pacific regional organizations 
did not take heed of the seriousness 
of domestic policy and politics. . . . It 
was obvious that their governments 
were not interested in any regional 
agreement that, in their view, carried 
the interests of Australia and New 
Zealand above theirs” (Levi 2017, 
20).
Despite pacer’s weaknesses, 
Australia’s Seasonal Worker Program 
(swp) and New Zealand’s Recognized 
Seasonal Employer (rse) scheme 
boomed in 2017, even after public-
ity over the deaths of twelve seasonal 
workers and cases of exploitation 
by employers (Maclellan 2017f). 
Expanding from horticulture into 
the agricultural and accommodation 
sectors, numbers to Australia jumped 
by 37 percent in 2016–2017 to 6,166 
seasonal workers. By year’s end, the 
World Bank had prepared a major 
new study with recommendations to 
expand the swp (World Bank 2018).
Australian engagement with the 
region is often framed as a policy of 
strategic denial against non-Western 
powers. Following concerns that 
Chinese corporation Huawei might 
build an Internet cable to Solomon 
Islands, Turnbull intervened to block 
the deal. This led to the signing of a 
bilateral security treaty between Aus-
tralia and Solomon Islands in August. 
The next month, there were further 
bilateral memoranda of understanding 
on security partnerships with Tuvalu 
and Nauru. Australia has also com-
mitted a$2 billion (us$1.6 billion) to 
the Pacific Maritime Security Program 
over the next thirty years to provide 
nineteen replacement patrol boats 
across the Pacific.
Shadow Defence Minister Richard 
Marles from the opposition Australian 
Labor Party also called for increased 
engagement by Australia in the Islands 
in a major speech to the Lowy Insti-
tute on 21 November. Marles argued 
that the “cornerstone” for renewed 
Pacific engagement “is a far more 
extensive and deeper defence relation-
ship with those countries which have 
a defence force. . . . it would benefit 
us to see the capability of the Pacific 
Island Countries’ defence forces grow” 
(Marles 2017). This is a worrying 
priority for those Pacific citizens who 
faced human rights abuses by military 
and police forces during the Bougain-
ville war or the coups in Fiji.
In government, Marles was an 
active supporter of French colonial-
ism in the Pacific, viewing France as 
a stable democratic partner against 
Chinese influence (Maclellan 2012). 
Following the 2016 decision to extend 
full Forum membership to New Cale-
donia and French Polynesia, Canberra 
and Paris signed a “Joint Statement 
of Enhanced Strategic Partnership 
between Australia and France” in 
March, extending an existing 2012 
declaration. The decision by the Turn-
bull government to award a contract 
worth a$50 billion (us$39 billion) to 
the French corporation Naval Group 
(formerly dcns) to build the next gen-
eration of submarines for the Royal 
Australian Navy has reinforced this 
global strategic engagement (Carroll 
and Ell 2017).
In the past, there were few alter-
natives to reliance on the anzus 
470 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)
(Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States) allies, Japan, and the 
European Union for trade, aid, and 
investment. Now there are a range of 
new partners in the region—major 
powers like China, India, and Indo-
nesia, and smaller, agile donors from 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. In 
contrast to existing Western donors, 
China has emphasized its identity as 
a South-South development partner, 
with a common identity as a develop-
ing nation (Zhang and Lawson 2017, 
198).
China stands out as the dominant 
strategic challenge for anzus in the 
Islands region. Forum Trade Com-
missioner to China David Morris said 
the Pacific governments were open to 
dialogue with China because of lack 
of support from traditional partners: 
“There’s no doubt Australia doesn’t 
think much about its neighborhood 
and the neighborhood knows that” 
(Martin 2017).
This tension was highlighted in a 
diplomatic spat between Beijing and 
Canberra in January 2018. Concetta 
Fierravanti-Wells, Australia’s minister 
for international cooperation and the 
Pacific, made front-page headlines 
when she criticized Chinese aid proj-
ects in the Pacific, accusing China of 
“duchessing” Pacific leaders and offi-
cials. Criticizing “roads to nowhere” 
built by China, she said: “You’ve 
got the Pacific full of these useless 
buildings which nobody maintains, 
which are basically white elephants” 
 (Riordan 2018, 1).
In response, Chinese diplomats 
lodged an official diplomatic com-
plaint. Xu Haijing, Australian corre-
spondent for Xinhua, polemicized: “If 
Australia really cares about its Pacific 
neighbors, it should first learn from 
China to treat those much smaller 
neighbors as equals and refrain from 
behaving like an arrogant overlord. 
The Australian government’s ‘default 
policy’ for all issues is to blame 
China” (Xu 2018).
Sāmoa’s prime minister openly 
 criticized Fierravanti-Wells’s com-
ments: “They are quite insulting to the 
leaders of the Pacific Island nations. 
To me as Chairman of the Pacific 
Leaders Forum, the comments ques-
tion the integrity, wisdom and intel-
ligence of the leaders of the Pacific 
Islands to judge what is good for our 
own people. These types of comments 
can damage the excellent relationships 
that exist between Australia and the 
Pacific Island countries, particularly 
Samoa” (Samoa Observer 2018).
Chinese outreach had a successful 
year. In March 2017, Forum Secre-
tary-General Taylor led a Forum trade 
delegation to Beijing, Guangzhou, and 
Hainan Province, promoting invest-
ment and trade opportunities in the 
Islands. She met with China’s Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Wang Yi to discuss 
ongoing support for mechanisms that 
link the People’s Republic and the 
Islands region: the Pacific Trade and 
Invest Office in Beijing, the China-pifs 
Development Cooperation Fund, and 
the pif-China Scholarship Programme 
(pifs 2017a).
With three pages printed in Chinese 
in the official handbook at the Apia 
Forum leaders’ meeting, it wasn’t hard 
to notice China’s influence in regional 
affairs. At the September Forum, Bei-
jing provided twenty vehicles to trans-
port the heads of government around 
Apia, and there was a major seminar 
on Chinese trade and investment in the 
political reviews • region in review 471
Forum venue (with support from just 
six Forum members, Taiwan hosted 
a dinner for its supporters away from 
the hotel).
At the 19th Communist Party of 
China National Congress in  October, 
President Xi Jinping announced, 
“China will increase assistance to 
other developing countries, especially 
the least developed countries, and do 
its part to reduce the North-South 
development gap” (Xi 2017). Under 
President Xi, China’s centerpiece for 
international development is the One 
Belt, One Road Initiative, potentially 
the largest infrastructure program in 
history. 
While the project is more focused 
on Central Asia, the Middle East, and 
Europe, the Belt and Road Initiative 
(bri) is also being extended to the 
Pacific Islands. China analyst Nick 
Bisley noted that the bri has four 
broad aims: “to build connectivity; 
develop China’s hinterlands; export 
surplus capital and capacity; and 
increase Chinese strategic influence. 
Indeed, the Chinese government insists 
that the program is not limited to the 
already vast purview of Eurasia—any 
country in the world can take part” 
(Bisley 2017).
Chinese investment and loans are 
facilitated through the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank, China 
Exim Bank, and state-supported 
corporations. Forum Trade Commis-
sioner to China David Morris said: 
“China has enormous financial capac-
ity to support economic development. 
It has now a private sector that is very 
actively looking for investment oppor-
tunities and it has a very fast growing 
outbound tourism market as well” 
(rnzi 2017a).
Along with ministerial represen-
tatives from Vanuatu, Sāmoa, and 
Tonga, Fiji Prime Minister Voreqe 
Bainimarama joined twenty-eight 
other heads of government to attend 
the “Belt and Road Forum for Interna-
tional Cooperation” in Beijing in May. 
After meetings between Bainimarama, 
President Xi, and Premier Li Keqiang, 
China and Fiji signed an Economic 
and Technical Cooperation Agree-
ment and an agreement establishing 
a China-Fiji Trade and Economic 
 Co-operation Commission. With 
China now serving as Fiji’s largest 
donor, Bainimarama also agreed to 
close Fiji’s trade office in Taiwan.
While Australia currently stands 
aloof from the bri, other Asia-Pacific 
nations, including New Zealand, are 
actively involved. By year’s end, newly 
reelected PNG Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill had signed a series of infra-
structure deals with China under the 
bri. 
The United Nations Development 
Programme (undp) is now investigat-
ing how China might finance regional 
initiatives to meet sdg development 
targets (undp 2017). This initiative 
comes as Australia, the United States, 
and other traditional donors are 
reducing their funding to UN agencies 
in the Pacific.
Despite the increasing regional 
engagement, there are still contradic-
tions in Beijing’s rising influence. The 
widespread celebration of China’s 
rapid economic growth underplays 
the internal contradictions of China’s 
social transformation, which involves 
rising proletarian expectations and 
labor unrest; massive environmental 
and energy problems; and unresolved 
questions over Tibet, Taiwan, Hong 
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Kong and Uyghur nationalism. On the 
80th anniversary of its publication, 
it’s worth rereading Mao Zedong’s 
classic essay “On Contradiction” 
as a reminder of the contradictions 
between classes and peoples in China 
(Mao 1967 [1937]).
In regional think tanks and con-
ferences, there is extensive debate 
over whether China’s outreach in the 
Islands is part of a strategic master-
plan or the outcome of decisions by 
state-owned companies and private 
investors. Strategic analysts are wor-
ried that Pacific governments face 
significant debt burdens from Chinese 
soft loans and overuse of Chinese 
labor (Lowy 2018).
In response, China’s Ambassador 
to Australia Cheng Jingye claimed: 
“China often takes into account the 
debt-paying ability and solvency of 
recipient countries, so avoiding creat-
ing too high a debt burden to recipient 
countries. . . . As the largest devel-
oping country in the world, China 
has been—all along—committed to 
providing all possible assistance to 
other developing countries within the 
framework of South-South coopera-
tion. This is a key demonstration of 
China’s role as a responsible major 
power. In providing foreign aid, the 
Chinese government always attaches 
no political strings, and fully respects 
the wishes and needs of the recipient 
countries” (Cheng 2018).
Like all donors, however, China 
does attach political strings, requir-
ing reaffirmation of the One China 
policy. States like Vanuatu, Papua 
New Guinea, and (unsuccessfully) 
Fiji have been encouraged to sup-
port China’s position in international 
maritime disputes in the South China 
Sea. Beijing also welcomes silence on 
sensitive topics like Tibet. Pacific aid 
recipients have been noticeably quiet 
about Chinese domestic human rights 
abuses. 
For Forum Secretary-General 
Taylor, it’s getting harder to juggle 
these sensitivities: “We’ve noticed a 
real heightened intensity over the last 
couple of months particularly, want-
ing our countries to be clear about 
the One China policy, insisting that 
missions that are promoting trade in 
Taiwan be closed. For the Secretariat, 
we respond to the member states and 
six of our members recognize Taiwan, 
so we have to accommodate that” 
(Maclellan 2017b).
With Taiwan-aligned states like 
Palau now being wooed by Beijing, 
Taiwan must work harder to maintain 
the allegiance of its supporters. In 
November, incoming Taiwanese Presi-
dent Tsai Ing-wen visited the Marshall 
Islands, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu. 
Despite this diplomacy, Taiwanese 
academic Kwei-Bo Huang has argued 
that Taiwan’s citizens are not sup-
portive of the government’s expensive 
outreach to small Caribbean and 
Pacific states: “Most believe aid to 
Pacific nations and Taiwan’s allies is 
a waste. In Taiwan, unfortunately, the 
South Pacific allies have often been 
portrayed as ‘poor, small, and black’ 
countries coveting Taiwan’s money. 
It is undeniable that part of Taiwan’s 
effort in this region has been focusing 
on winning official recognition while 
under pressure from Beijing” (Huang 
2017).
With Chinese officials monitoring 
criticism in the region, Xi Jinping’s 
current crackdown on corruption 
has extended to the Islands. In an 
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unprecedented move, Chinese officials 
chartered a plane to Nadi in August 
and seventy-seven Chinese citizens 
living in Fiji were deported back to 
China, allegedly for involvement in 
telecom and online fraud. China’s 
official explanation for this unusual 
extradition was questioned by the 
Fiji opposition, who raised questions 
about prostitution by Chinese nation-
als overstaying in Fiji. China analyst 
Graeme Smith noted: “One of the 
great ironies of these show arrests is 
that the Chinese police were given 
more power in Fiji than they usually 
wield in China” (Smith 2017).
During periods of conflict and anti-
Chinese rioting a decade ago, China 
evacuated its citizens from Tonga, 
Timor-Leste, and Solomon Islands 
aboard civilian aircraft (Smith 2012). 
Now defense analysts are concerned 
about possible future use of military 
aircraft for regional emergencies 
 (Connolly 2016). 
China’s diplomatic profile in the 
region is raising concern in New Delhi 
as well as Canberra, Wellington, 
and Tokyo. Indian Prime Minister 
 Narendra Modi visited Fiji in 2014, 
and President Pranab Mukherjee 
visited Papua New Guinea and New 
Zealand in April 2016 (the visit to 
Port Moresby was a first for an Indian 
head of state). Even after these state 
visits, India-Pacific relations have been 
slow to take off, despite the creation 
of the Forum for India–Pacific Islands 
Cooperation, which held leaders’ 
summits in Suva in 2014 and Jaipur 
in 2015. 
Suva hosted the India–Pacific 
Islands Sustainable Development 
 Conference in May 2017, welcom-
ing a large delegation led by India’s 
Minister of State for External Affairs 
General V K Singh (Singh 2017). At 
the conference, India provided f$3.6 
million (us$1.8 million) toward the 
Bainimarama government’s micro and 
small business grants program, as well 
as funds for the cop23 Secretariat. 
The two countries also signed a new 
defense agreement, with pledges by 
New Delhi to improve Fiji’s small and 
outdated naval base. In December, the 
Indian government provided a further 
f$1 million (us$495,000) grant to 
the Fijian sugar industry to purchase 
 agricultural equipment from India.
At a time of nuclear crisis (dis-
cussed later in this review), South 
Korea is also seeking to expand its 
modest links to the region. In Decem-
ber, newly elected President Moon 
Jae-in met with foreign ministers from 
thirteen Pacific Island countries at his 
presidential office, during the third 
South Korea–Pacific Islands Forum 
foreign ministers’ dialogue. 
Moon announced that he hoped 
to participate in the November 2018 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(apec) summit to be hosted in Papua 
New Guinea. The O’Neill government 
is hoping that apec will strengthen 
economic ties between Asia and the 
Pacific Islands, especially investment 
in Papua New Guinea. Already, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand have provided 
policing and intelligence support to 
the PNG government as Port Moresby 
prepares for a major influx of interna-
tional delegates.
Australia and New Zealand con-
tinue to collaborate on counter-ter-
rorism and transnational crime in the 
region—work that continues despite 
political tensions between the conser-
vative Coalition in Canberra and the 
474 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018)
new Ardern Labour government in 
Wellington. In one spat, a NZ Labour 
member of Parliament was falsely 
accused of instigating a citizenship 
dispute involving Australian Deputy 
Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce (a dual 
ANZ citizen). Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop foolishly attacked “treacher-
ous behavior” by NZ Labour, saying 
she “would find it very hard to build 
trust with those involved in allegations 
designed to undermine the Govern-
ment of Australia” (Belot and  Dziedzic 
2017). 
These spats, however, do not 
overcome common interests within 
the Forum. Michael Goldsmith has 
noted that “the cultural gap between 
the twin white settler nations and 
their Pacific counterparts sometimes 
thrust the former two into an alliance 
 vis-à-vis the rest” (2017, 190).
Security policy remains a central 
element of Pacific regionalism. Despite 
storm clouds brewing over self-deter-
mination in Bougainville and New 
Caledonia, it was a relatively stable 
year in the region.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo 
visited West Papua in May, the fifth 
visit he has made in an effort to 
promote Indonesian development 
initiatives. This soft diplomacy has not 
quietened the West Papuan national-
ist movement, which responded with 
protests. During the month of the 
president’s visit, police arrested nearly 
two hundred people in Sentani and 
seventy-seven members of the West 
Papua National Committee (knpb) in 
Merauke.
Representatives of the United 
Liberation Movement for West 
Papua (ulmwp) continued to lobby 
for regional action. Benny Wenda 
toured New Zealand in May to meet 
politicians, officials, and trade unions, 
while Octo Mote attended the Sep-
tember Forum leaders’ meeting in 
Apia, after lobbying in Melanesian 
capitals. Samoan union supporters of 
the ulmwp rallied opposite the Forum 
venue.
With action on West Papua within 
the Forum and the msg blocked by 
the larger powers, the “Group of 
Seven” countries have been taking 
initiatives in international forums. 
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Nauru, Palau, and the Mar-
shall Islands presented a joint state-
ment on West Papua to the acp 
(African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
Groups of States) Council of Min-
isters in Brussels in May. Indonesia 
reacted sharply. In a tone unlikely to 
win friends, the Indonesian embassy 
in Port Vila stated: “The overwhelm-
ing majority of Pacific countries have 
no agenda to push for the separation 
of sovereign territories of Indonesia. 
Calls to redraw the borders of Indo-
nesia by a few politicians in Vanuatu, 
Solomon Islands and elsewhere, are 
simply crazy and irrational talk. These 
absurdities are talks of desperate and 
vulnerable political leaders clinging to 
stay in power” (rnzi 2017b).
Given diverse positions among 
Forum members, Dame Meg Tay-
lor has proposed a “softly, softly” 
approach to engagement with Jakarta: 
“The Forum as a whole is concerned 
about human rights issues, but wants 
those conversations with Indonesia to 
continue, recognizing that you’ve got 
leadership in Indonesia that is much 
more open about issues in Papua and 
West Papua” (Maclellan 2017e). In 
their communiqué from Apia, Forum 
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leaders recognized “the constructive 
engagement by the Forum countries 
with Indonesia with respect to elec-
tions and human rights in West Papua 
and Papua and to continue a dialogue 
in an open and constructive manner” 
(pifs 2017b).
During the year, there has been 
some significant progress toward more 
self-governance and protection of 
Indigenous rights in Rapa Nui. Chile 
turned over administration of the 
Rapa Nui national park to a board 
elected by Indigenous people. A bill to 
severely restrict non-Indigenous immi-
gration to the island is under consider-
ation by the Chilean congress. Despite 
this, genuine political autonomy and 
the usurpation of land titles by the 
Chilean state are ongoing problems 
(Gomez 2010).
After fourteen years and a$2.8 
billion (us$2.2 billion) cost to Austra-
lia, the Regional Assistance Mission 
to Solomon Islands (ramsi) formally 
ended at the end of June. Over this 
period, 7,280 Australian Defence 
Force personnel were deployed to 
Solomon Islands under Operation 
Anode, working with His Majesty’s 
Armed Forces from Tonga and New 
Zealand and Papua New Guinea 
defense forces. ramsi’s Participating 
Police Force involved officers from 
every Forum member country.
ramsi won popular support for the 
rapid demilitarization of the 1998–
2003 political and social crisis and the 
subsequent destruction of weapons. 
But later “state-building” and policing 
operations were more controversial 
(Fraenkel, Madraiwiwi, and Okole 
2014). To evaluate the costs and 
benefits of ramsi, citizens of Solomon 
Islands can access a valuable research 
tool about the ramsi years with the 
publication of a “Select Bibliography 
on Solomon Islands, 2003–2017” by 
longtime historian of Melanesia Clive 
Moore (Moore 2017).
Despite the end of ramsi, Australia 
maintains an ongoing defense relation-
ship with Honiara through its Defence 
Cooperation Program. A new pack-
age of law and justice support will be 
implemented through the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the 
Australian Federal Police.
In turn, Solomon Islands has fol-
lowed other Pacific countries into 
UN peacekeeping. Five Royal Solo-
mon Islands Police officers joined the 
United Nations African Mission in 
Darfur (unamid) for a twelve-month 
deployment in 2016–2017. As Prime 
Minister Sogavare noted before the 
UN General Assembly in September, 
“This is Solomon Islands’ first humble 
contribution to the maintenance of 
world peace” (Sogavare 2017). Along-
side Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
soldiers, police officers from Solomon 
Islands, Palau, Sāmoa, and Fiji have 
now served in unamid.
Nuclear disarmament surged back 
on to the regional and international 
agenda in 2017, as US President Don-
ald Trump and North Korean Presi-
dent Kim Jong-un traded macho barbs 
over who had the biggest button. Kim 
threatened missile launches toward 
US military bases in Guåhan (Guam), 
while Trump threatened to rain “fire 
and fury” on the Korean people. 
Given that Pacific peoples have 
suffered from more than 310 nuclear 
tests—in Marshall Islands, French 
Polynesia, Kiribati, Australia, and 
Johnston Atoll—there was widespread 
anger when Trump tweeted that the 
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United States “must greatly strengthen 
and expand its nuclear capability, 
until such time as the world comes to 
its senses regarding nukes” (Trump 
2016).
The year 2017–2018 is the 60th 
anniversary of the United King-
dom’s Grapple hydrogen bomb tests, 
conducted on Malden Island and 
Christmas (Kiritimati) Island in the 
British Gilbert and Ellice Islands 
colony—today part of Kiribati. British 
authorities continue to resist compen-
sation pleas from nuclear veterans 
from  Britain, Fiji, and New Zealand 
who face adverse health effects after 
participating in Operation Grapple 
(Maclellan 2017c).
Even with the failure of the 2014 
RMI disarmament case in the US 
Federal Court and litigation in the 
International Court of Justice (icj), 
the cases have had an effect on nuclear 
policy by the weapons states. After the 
RMI case against the United Kingdom 
won support from half the icj bench, 
the British government withdrew from 
compulsory icj jurisdiction on  matters 
relating to nuclear disarmament in 
February 2017 (UK Government 
2017).
In a 1 March speech on the anniver-
sary of the US Bravo hydrogen bomb 
test, RMI President Hilda Heine called 
for the United States to take respon-
sibility for health and environmental 
impacts of past nuclear testing across 
her country (Maclellan 2017a). The 
2017 Forum communiqué required 
that “the Forum Secretariat coordinate 
assistance by crop agencies to the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands in 
addressing ongoing impacts of nuclear 
testing including human rights, envi-
ronmental contamination and health 
impacts,” with a report on actions to 
be prepared for the 49th Forum in 
Nauru (pifs 2017b).
In March and July, more than 120 
governments met to negotiate a treaty 
to ban nuclear weapons under inter-
national law. The call for a nuclear 
ban treaty was based on the recogni-
tion that the humanitarian impact 
of nuclear weapon use is morally 
 unacceptable and that these weapons 
of mass destruction represent a signifi-
cant risk to human security. 
At the March negotiations, the 
International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons (ican) launched 
a report on the impact of testing in 
the Pacific (Maclellan 2017d). ican 
also supported Indigenous activists 
from French Polynesia, Marshall 
Islands, Fiji, Japan, and Aboriginal 
Australia to travel to New York to 
lobby  governments. This lobbying led 
to  significant outcomes, with a key 
section in the treaty obliging parties 
to assist nuclear survivors and the 
preamble recognizing “the dispro-
portionate impact of nuclear-weapon 
activities on indigenous peoples” (UN 
2017b). After adoption in a 122-1-1 
vote, the treaty was opened for signa-
ture on 20 September. Fiji, Kiribati, 
New Zealand, Palau, Sāmoa, Tuvalu, 
and Vanuatu were among the fifty 
states that signed the treaty on the first 
day. Once fifty nations have ratified or 
acceded to the new ban treaty, it will 
enter into force.
Addressing the UN General Assem-
bly, Forum Chair Tuilaepa said: “As 
a signatory to this historic treaty, we 
wanted to demonstrate unequivo-
cally our aspiration to have a world 
without nuclear weapons. The conven-
tional narrative that the possession of 
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nuclear weapons will act as deterrent 
to make the world a safer place to live, 
is not borne out by the current reali-
ties—otherwise the developments in 
the Korean peninsula would not have 
happened at all” (Tuilaepa 2017b).
Aligned with US extended nuclear 
deterrence, the Turnbull government 
opposed, then boycotted, the process, 
the first time ever that Australia has 
refused to participate in multilateral 
disarmament negotiations. On the 
other hand, Australian activists were 
the founders of ican in April 2007. 
Their vision of a nuclear-free world 
was rewarded a decade later when 
the global citizens’ movement was 
awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. 
Citizen diplomacy in the Pacific, 
however, was set back by the tragic 
deaths of regional champions for 
disarmament, demilitarization, and 
the rights of Pacific peoples. In 2017, 
we lost French activist Bruno Barril-
lot, a founder of Moruroa e Tatou in 
Tahiti; Yankunytjatjara elder Yami 
Lester, blinded by British nuclear tests 
on Aboriginal land; Marshall Islands 
Ambassador Tony de Brum, a prophet 
on disarmament, climate change, and 
Micronesian sovereignty; and Tere-
sia Teaiwa, scholar, poet, feminist, 
and mentor to a generation of young 
women and men. We can but hope to 
carry on their vision for the region.
nic maclellan
Disclosure: The author is a former 
ican board member and author of the 
ican nuclear-testing study “Prohibiting 
Nuclear Weapons: A Pacific Islands 
Priority.”
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